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 The workers' value of the remaining employment contract duration  
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper introduces and applies a method for estimating workers' marginal 
willingness to pay for job attributes employing data on job search activity. Worker's willingness 
to pay for the remaining duration of the employment contract is derived. We provide evidence 
that workers attach substantial value to the remaining contract duration. A temporary worker 
with a remaining contract of 6 months is willing to pay about 10% of the wage to increase the 
contract by one month. 
 
Keywords: On-the-job search; Job attributes; Contract duration; Temporary job. 
JEL: J3, J6. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the eighteenth century, when Adam Smith wrote "The Wealth of Nations", economists 
have been interested in how the theory of compensating wage differentials might explain the 
existence of wage differences in the labour market. One of the attractions of this theory is that it 
allows for the estimation of workers' marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for job attributes such 
as collective bargaining and the risk of becoming unemployed. This may explain the impressive 
number of empirical hedonic wage studies that have focused on the workers' willingness to pay 
for attributes. Although many studies have shown that nonwage differences between jobs can be 
significant to workers, the general conclusion is that nonwage differences between jobs are not 
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very important to workers (see Brown, 1980; Rosen, 1986). 
The theory of compensating wage differentials assumes that workers have complete 
information in a static environment. This suggests that if job outcomes are a result of a dynamic 
process and workers having to search for jobs, estimates for the willingness to pay for job 
attributes may be biased. These considerations have encouraged theoretical research that looks at 
the willingness to pay for attributes. In particular, it has been demonstrated that the estimates of 
the conventional marginal willingness to pay for a job attribute are likely to be biased 
downwards if it is not acknowledged that a job is a search good and a result of a match between 
an employer and a worker (Hwang et al., 1992). For example, if firms differ with respect to the 
cost of providing nonwage job attributes, then low cost firms offer both higher wages and greater 
values of desirable job attributes, because they face greater opportunity costs in having job 
vacancies go unfilled. This example may be particularly relevant in the context of the risk of 
unemployment, because more profitable firms are less likely to make employees redundant. 
Hwang et al. (1998) demonstrate that the estimate of the workers’ MWP derived from the 
conventional hedonic wage methodology are biased when firms are heterogeneous and on-the-
job mobility is present. This strongly suggests that MWP estimates are particularly biased for 
subgroups of workers / jobs for which on-the-job mobility is high. The main examples here are 
workers with a temporary contract. 
These considerations have generated a number of studies aimed at estimating the MWP 
for job attributes using data on job moving behaviour and comparing the MWP estimates with 
conventional estimates (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van 
Ommeren et al., 2000; Manning, 2003).1 These studies point to considerably higher estimates 
                                                          
1
 In addition, these considerations have generated a number of studies to improve conventional estimates by 
correcting for mobility bias (see, for example, Kim, 1992). 
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than those based on conventional hedonic wage methods. Herzog and Schlottmann (1990) and 
Gronberg and Reed (1994) reported higher estimates for the willingness to pay to avoid job-
induced risk. Van Ommeren et al. (2000) and Manning (2003) found higher estimates for the 
willingness to pay to avoid commuting. Similarly, Bartik et al. (1992) compared the MWP for 
residential characteristics based on residential moving behaviour and hedonic price methods and 
showed that the MWP estimates for crime reduction and school quality are higher than those 
based on conventional estimates. In addition, McCue and Reed (1996) examined self-reported 
data on the workers' willingness to pay for job attributes, and concluded that "workers' valuations 
of nonpecuniary dimensions of work are substantially larger than previous research has 
indicated". 
Given the frequent use of hedonic-based models to assess the benefits of environmental, 
health and safety regulations in the labour and housing market, these results are relevant for 
theoretical and applied research and policy makers. "Hedonic-based benefit estimates shou1d be 
used with caution, and other benefit estimation approaches should receive greater emphasis." 
(Bartik et al., 1992).  A substantial progress has been made recently in the methodology of 
estimating willingness to pay for various job attributes (see e. g. Heckman et al, 2003, Ekeland et 
al 2003). A rapidly growing literature addresses individual heterogeneity and selection bias (see 
e.g. Carneiro et al. 2003; Heckman and Li, 2003). However, this strand of literature relies on the 
equilibrium assumption that workers maximize their utility at the current job. We argue in the 
current paper that for certain applications, such as in the case of temporary jobs, such an 
assumption may be inaccurate. 
In this paper, we use a method to estimate the MWP for job attributes that explicitly 
acknowledges that jobs are search goods. We demonstrate that the workers' MWP for job 
attributes can be derived from data on job search activity
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same type of theoretical search model as those studies in which MWP estimates are derived from 
data on job moving behaviour (Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Van Ommeren et al., 2000). In these 
search models, it is assumed that workers are involuntarily separated due to firm firings (e.g. 
Gronberg and Reed, 1994). We relax this assumption by assuming that the involuntarily 
separation rate may depend on job attributes. This extension is essential, because both Gronberg 
and Reed (1994) and Van Ommeren et al. (2000) explicitly assume that the involuntary 
separation rate is exogenous of job attributes. Gronberg and Reed (1994, p. 913) state "The 
assumption that the involuntary separation rate is exogenous of firm wage and nonwage 
characteristics is crucial for empirically identifying workers' marginal willingness to pay for job 
attributes."2 The exogeneity assumption is clearly not innocuous and limits the applicability of 
the MWP method, since it implies that firms fire randomly disregarding the wage of the worker 
although it seems plausible that firms make the worker's wage part of the firing decision. 
Moreover, by allowing the involuntary separation rate to depend on job attributes, we are able to 
generate estimates of the MWP for job attributes such as the duration of the employment 
contract, which are related to the risk of becoming unemployed.3 
 In this paper, we estimate workers' marginal willingness to pay for job attributes in 
Estonia (1998-2001) and Lithuania (2000). Our emphasis is on the MWP for the remaining 
duration of the employment contract. An important distinction is therefore between permanent 
jobs (contracts of unlimited duration) and temporary jobs, (i.e. contracts of fixed duration and 
seasonal or casual jobs). Temporary jobs are associated with a higher than average 
unemployment risk: Table 1 shows that in 1999-2002 workers with fixed-term contracts in 
                                                          
2
 Khanker (1988) employs the identical exogeneity assumption in his work on compensating wage differentials. 
3
 In the literature on the theory of compensating wage differentials there is a large interest in MWP estimates of the 
risk of becoming unemployed (Rosen, 1986). Compensating wage differentials estimation methods are plagued by 
the endogeneity of job riskiness (Garen, 1988; Moretti, 2000). As is well known, search theory is particularly well 
suited to the analysis of the effect of risk on labor market behaviour (Mortensen, 1986).  
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Estonia and Lithuania were several times more likely to become unemployed or inactive one 
year later than workers with permanent contracts.4 Temporary contracts may have other 
disadvantages as well for workers. For example, there is evidence that temporary workers 
receive less on-the-job training (Booth et al., 2002). According to Estonian LFS 2001 data, 3.5 
percent of permanent workers and none of the temporary workers participated in training courses 
or seminars at work during the 4 weeks before the survey.5 Estimates of MWP for temporary 
jobs therefore do not only measure the MWP for risk, but also for other unobserved job 
attributes. It is however plausible that the remaining duration of the job contract, conditional on 
the type of contract, is unrelated to unobserved job attributes such as training, so the MWP for 
remaining duration provides a more precise estimate of the MWP for unemployment risk. 
 Lithuania and Estonia are former Soviet republics, which at the time of observation were 
at the end of their first decade of transition to the market economy. Labour force participation in 
both countries was then close to the EU average, but the unemployment rate was high (16.1 
percent according to ILO definition in Lithuania, 2000; 12.8 percent in Estonia, 2001). This, 
combined with subjective evidence, suggest that workers were concerned about the risk of losing 
their jobs.6 Other relevant job-security related features of Lithuanian and Estonian labour 
markets, which distinguish them from established market economies, are very low unionisation 
                                                          
4
 This is consistent with the late 1990s results for EU-15 reported by European Commission, 2002, Table 25. 
Similarly, in OECD countries perceived job security in late 1990s was lower for temporary workers (OECD 2004, 
Chart 2.8). 
5
 Controlling for variety of worker and characteristics, temporary workers in EU-15 are significantly less likely to be 
satisfied with their jobs (European Commission, 2002, Table 31). 
6
 Regular public opinion polls show that job security is the most important characteristic of work for workers in the 
Baltic countries. Rose (2000, p.12) reports that about 90% of employed respondents are worried about possibility of 
losing their job. The main explanation is plausibly the combination of high unemployment rates and low levels of 
unemployment and welfare benefits. Lithuania's unemployment benefits do not follow an insurance principle and 
are maximally two-third of the minimum wage and less than half of the average gross wage. Furhermore, most 
unemployed do not receive unemployment benefits (UB). In Estonia only about 25 percent of unemployed receives 
earnings-related UB, and about 50 percent receive unemployment assistance benefit (less than 10 percent of average 
monthly wages).  Hence,  the welfare loss from becoming unemployed is likely much larger for workers in 
Lithuania and Estonia than for EU-15 workers. 
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(OECD, 2003) and little workers’ preference towards shorter working hours or part-time work.7  
Employment protection legislation related to contracts of unlimited duration in Estonia and 
Lithuiania is stricter than EU-15 average, while regulation of limited duration contracts is more 
liberal (see Eamets and Masso (2004)). Such legislation, as shown in OECD (2004) is likely to 
result in low job security for temporary workers. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we introduce the search model. We 
then derive the optimal search strategy in section three and derive the workers' marginal 
willingness to pay for nonwage job attributes. In section four, the estimation method for the 
MWP is discussed. The MWP for the employment contract duration is estimated for Estonia and 
Lithuania in section five. Section six concludes the paper. 
 
2. THE SEARCH MODEL 
The point of departure in this paper is an employed individual who lives forever. This individual 
derives utility from job attributes X. v(X) is the quasi-concave instantaneous utility function 
associated with a job having attributes X. Employed individuals take into account that they may 
become unemployed in the future. Let δ denote the involuntary separation rate of workers from 
jobs. We emphasise that δ may depend on job nonwage attributes X, so δ = δ(X). In particular, 
the risk of becoming unemployed is a decreasing function of the remaining duration of the 
employment contract. We allow X to be non-stationary, so X may include the employment 
contract duration, which decreases over time. For simplicity, we assume that all job attributes X 
are stationary, except the remaining contract duration, denoted as τ, which decreases over time. 
Hence, at τ = 0, the employed will become unemployed. 
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 Just 7 percent of all employees in Lithuania would like to work shorter hours if their earnings are adjusted 
accordingly, while in EU-15 and Norway, this figure is, on average, 49 percent (EFILW, 2003).  
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The employed person searches in the labour market with effort s at a cost of k(s), s ≥ 0. 
Search costs k(s) are increasing and convex in search effort s, hence k'(s) > 0 and k"(s) > 0. Jobs 
arrive with arrival rate p(s). The job arrival rate p is increasing and concave in s, hence p'(s) > 0 
and p"(s) < 0. We suppose that the effects of the search costs on instantaneous utility are 
additive. Job attributes offers are drawn randomly from a given distribution, which is 
independent of X.8 X0 denotes the attributes of the job offered to the job searcher. Pooling of 
offers is not allowed: job offers are either refused or accepted before other offers arrive. 
The expected lifetime utility received from the current job is denoted as V(X). Future 
utility is discounted at rate ρ.  V includes the possibility of offers in the future. The individual is 
assumed to maximise lifetime utility V. The decision whether to accept a job offer accounts for 
expected future offers. Discounted lifetime utility can then be written as the sum of the 
instantaneous utility, the expected benefit of accepting a job offer during the next time unit and 
the expected loss of becoming unemployed. U denotes the expected lifetime utility of an 
unemployed individual. This leads to the following equation: 
 
.
)()]()[(]0),()(max[)()()()( 0 τδρ ∂
∂
−−+−+−=
XVXVUXXVXVEspskXvXV           (1)                                      
   
In this expression the expectation E is taken with respect to the distribution of the job attributes 
X0. The interpretation of the above formula is well known (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986). Current 
utility equals v(X)-k(s). At rate p(s) a job offer will be received, and that offer will be accepted if 
the value of the new job exceeds that of the current position. Hence, the optimal acceptance 
                                                          
8
 In case the employed individual considers taking a second job, the distribution of job attributes of both jobs 
depends on X, so this assumption is violated. The proportion of workers that consider a second job is small. In the 
data we analyse later on, only 0.4% of all workers (4.3% of all searchers) search for a second job. 
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strategy is to accept a job offer if V(X0)-V(X) > 0. The offer should otherwise be rejected. At rate 
δ(X), the worker may become unemployed. The term ∂V(X)/∂τ equals the depreciation in V as 
the contract is due to expire at τ = 0 (Van den Berg, 1990) 
 
3. THE MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR JOB ATTRIBUTES 
In this section, the choice of search effort s is derived using the first-order condition for the 
worker's optimal search effort. The optimal choice of s is obtained by differentiating equation (1) 
with respect to s, and setting the resultant to zero (and noting that ∂2V(X)/∂τ∂s = 0) gives us: 
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∂
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k
.                                                   (2) 
 
The interpretation of equation (2) is well known (Mortensen, 1986). The marginal search cost 
equals the marginal benefit of an increase in the job arrival rate. The second-order condition is 
that the left-hand side of equation (2) is decreasing in s. The concavity of p and the convexity of 
k in their arguments ensure that this condition will be satisfied. Our conditions do not ensure that 
job effort is positive. Hence, if s = 0, then the marginal costs of search are higher than the 
marginal benefits and (2) does not hold.  
We will use equation (2) to express the marginal effect of a change in a job attribute Xi on 
the workers' search effort. Dividing both sides by ∂p/∂s, differentiating with respect to Xi and 
using the envelope theorem (so the effect of Xi on V via s can be ignored since ∂V/∂s = 0), gives: 
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where Pr[V(X0)-V(X) > 0] denotes the probability of accepting a job offer (note that 
∂Emax[V(X0)-V(X),0]/∂Xi = -∂V(X)/∂Xi. Pr[V(X0)-V(X) > 0]). Suppose that i = 1,...,n+1 and that 
the n+1's job attribute is the wage. The workers' marginal willingness to pay for the ith nonwage 
job attribute (MWPi) is here defined as the ratio of the marginal lifetime utility of the ith job 
attribute over the marginal lifetime utility of the wage, so MWPi = [∂V(X)/∂Xi]/[∂V(X)/∂w]. 
Hence, by using equation (3), we obtain: 
 
w
s
X
sMWP
i
i ∂
∂
∂
∂
= / ,                 if s > 0                                                            (4) 
 
where i = 1,...,n. Our main result is that the workers' marginal willingness to pay for the ith 
nonwage job attribute, MWPi, equals the ratio of the marginal effects of the ith nonwage attribute 
and the wage on search effort. We emphasise here that these MWPi estimates are derived from 
the relationship between Xi and job search behaviour. As emphasised in the introduction, MWP 
estimates based on observations of job moves need to rely on the assumption that δ does not 
depend on X (Gronberg and Reed, 1994). This assumption is needed, because job moves consist 
of voluntary and involuntary job moves, which are not distinguishable.9 In case of observations 
of job search, one does not need such an assumption, because job search is always voluntarily, 
even if triggered by a threat of involuntary separation.  
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 One of the consequences is that if involuntary moves are positively associated with wages (hence, employers are 
more likely to fire workers with higher wages), the MWP estimates based on job mobility are too high. This may be 
one of explanations why MWP estimates based on job mobility tend to be high. For example, in a recent application, 
the results by Manning (2003) based on the British Labor Force Surveys and Household Panel Surveys suggest that 
the MWP estimates for commuting time based on job mobility are too high. In these surveys, one cannot distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary moves. 
 11 
 
4. ESTIMATION METHOD 
We will discuss here a method for estimating workers’ MWP for job attributes given information 
on search behaviour. Suppose that exact information on desired search effort s is not available 
and it is only known whether workers report that they search (s* = 1) or do not search (s* = 0). 
Workers report that they search when search effort exceeds zero. One may then specify search 
activity s* by means of a latent-variable framework: s = β'Y+u, E(u) = 0; β is a vector of 
unknown coefficients. Y represents a vector of explanatory variables which includes job 
attributes X; u is a random variable with expectation 0. So, s and s* are related as follows: s* = 1, 
if s > 0 and s* = 0 if s ≤ 0. Estimation of this discrete choice model is standard. Estimates of β 
are consistent, because estimating a tobit specification using a probit model generates consistent 
(but inefficient) estimates of β/σ, where σ is the standard deviation of the error term (Maddala, 
1983, p. 159). We may ignore σ-1, because it cancels out when we calculate the MWP as we 
focus on the ratio of β’s. 
Let βi be the parameter associated with job attribute Xi, i = 1,...,n+1. It is then obvious 
that ∂E(s|s > 0)/∂Xi = ∂E(s)/∂Xi = βi, i = 1,...,n+1. So, although (4) only holds for s > 0 (and not 
for s = 0), it is sufficient to consistenly estimate βi, and therefore MWPi, using data on s*. 
Suppose now that the n+1's job attribute is the logarithm of the wage and let βw be the parameter 
associated with the logarithm of the wage. The ratio of the marginal effects of the ith nonwage 
attribute and the wage on expected conditional search effort, the condition being that s > 0, is 
then equal to wβi/βw and thus using (4): 
 
niwMWP wii ,...,1,/ == ββ .                                                  (5) 
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In consequence, estimates of wβi/βw can be interpreted as the workers' marginal 
willingness to pay for the ith nonwage job attribute (MWPi). Hence, the MWPi is proportional to 
the current wage.10 
 
5. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
5.1 Data, descriptives and methods  
Our data come from several national labor force surveys. Our main results are based on 21075 
observations of employees living and working in Estonia (in 2001) and on 2641 observations of 
employees living and working in Lithuania in 2000 (fourth quarter). For some descriptive 
variables, we will use data from other years as well to present similar figures for both countries. 
Incidence of on-the-job search in Estonia is 4.2 percent, while in Lithuania it was 8.8 
percent in 200011 (but dropped to 4.5 percent in 2002-2003). Table 2 reveals that in both 
countries temporary workers,12 as well as part-time workers and those with short tenures are 
much more likely to search. Workers with short temporary contracts (less than 6 months) are 
more likely to be engaged in search than those with longer temporary contracts. The descriptives 
indicate that temporary and part-time males search more often than their female counterparts. 
Nevertheless, compared to data from West-European countries, observed search differences 
between males and females are relatively small. For example in the UK and in the Netherlands, 
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 It may be argued that the effect of Xi on s is structurally different for s > 0 from the case that s ≤ 0. This does not 
affect (5), because in this case ∂E(s|s > 0)/∂Xi = βiPr(s > 0), so (5) follows again.  
11
 Incidence of on-the-job search including search for a second job is only slightly higher (9.2%). This percentage is 
comparable to EU countries. For example, the same percentage is reported in the Netherlands (Statistics 
Netherlands, 1992). In the UK, somewhat lower percentages are reported (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994). 
12
 The average contract duration in Lithuania is just under 6 months. About 70% of the contracts are for less than 6 
months. For Estonia, total contract duration is not reported, but average remaining duration is 3.5 months which 
implies average total duration of 7 months given random sampling. Hence, the average contract durations are almost 
identical. 
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part-time female workers search on average less than their full-time counterparts (e.g. Pissarides 
and Wadsworth, 1994), whereas in Lithuania and Estonia they search more.13 This phenomenon 
is thought to be related to the strong employment position of females in the Baltic labor markets 
(OECD, 2003). 
Subjective information indicates that in both countries 50 to 60% of the job searchers 
state that they search because they wish to improve their working conditions, about 20% search 
because the current job is anticipated to be terminated or seen as transitional and another 20% 
search to increase the number of the hours worked (see Table 3).14 Table 3 also suggests that the 
reasons for search are similar for males and females.15 As one might expect, most temporary 
workers search because the current job will be terminated or is seen as transitional. 
 
5.2 Results 
Our key variable of interest, the remaining duration of the contract, is observed directly for 
Estonia, but not for Lithuania and therefore the results will be presented separately. We will first 
discuss the results for Estonia. 
 
5.2.1 Estonia 
MWP estimates have been derived from a range of probit models16. The theoretical section 
suggests following specification of the search effort s: 
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 In this sense, the Lithuanian and Estonian labor markets are more similar to the US labor market. 
14
 Respondents were allowed to choose only one reason.  
15
 The data suggest that part-time work is not seen as attractive in Lithuania and Estonia. Part-time workers tend to 
search in particular because they wish to increase the number of working hours. 
16
 Post-stratifying weights provided by the Statistical Department were used in the estimation process. Reported 
standard errors are the robust ones and allow for clustering within households. MWP estimates appear to be 
insensitive to the use of weights. Results without weights can be received from the authors upon request. 
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   s = β'Z +βtempTEMP+ βdur log(DUR)*TEMP+βwlog(w)+u,   (6) 
 
where TEMP is a dummy for temporary jobs (as classified by the worker), DUR is the remaining 
contract duration in months, Z is vector of other personal, job and background characteristics (to 
be discussed later), and u is random error. The contract duration is specified in logarithms, which 
is consistent with the assumption that the utility function v is plausibly a concave function of the 
contract duration. Given (4) and (6), MWP for an extra month of contract duration for a 
temporary worker is inversely related to duration: 
 
MWPdur = w DUR
wdur ββ
  ,    (7) 
 
i.e. workers with short contracts are more concerned about their job security17. As control 
variables, we distinguish between three different types of permanent contracts which differ from 
the standard permanent contract. Workers employed as civil servants have permanent contracts 
which differ from other workers. Further, a small number of workers have ‘verbal contracts’ or 
‘contracts of agreement’ which tend to give less protection than the standard permanent contract 
but for which the duration is not specified. Other control variables include worker's education, 
age (and its square), tenure, gender, belonging to ethnic minority, living in rural area, having 
non-manual occupation, as well as plant size and working in public or private sector. 
Furthermore, we control for sector of employment (15 industries) and region by residence (15 
counties and capital city). The results estimates of (6) can be found in Table 4, specification [1]). 
It demonstrates that a temporary worker with a remaining 6 months contract is willing to pay 9.7 
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(s.e. 5.1) percent of monthly wage for a one month extension. This implies that a worker with a 
new 6 months contract is willing to pay once 170 (s.e. 89) percent of monthly wage to get a 10 
year contract. 18 19 
The above presented result ignores that it may be argued that very long temporary 
contracts are effectively as valuable as a permanent contract (in fact, it is more difficult to fire 
workers with temporary contracts which have not expired yet than those with permanent ones), 
suggesting that the estimate, although consistent, is not efficiently estimated. Therefore, we 
presume that a 120 months contract duration is as valuable to a worker as a permanent contract, 
and set DUR equal to 120 for permanent jobs with ‘regular’ employment contracts, while the 
TEMP dummy is dropped from (6).20 This specification (not reported in the Tables) gives MWP 
for an extra month (evaluated at a 6 months remaining duration) equal to 10.5 (s.e. 1.8) percent 
of monthly wage. This estimate is close to the previous one but has a substantially smaller error. 
Note that the latter MWP estimate is more efficiently estimated, but the estimate may be 
inconsistent, because the added restriction may be invalid for arguments given above. Several 
tests do not reject this restriction however.21 
The estimates may be criticised on the ground that the wage is reported with 
measurement error, resulting in a smaller βw and therefore an upward bias in the MWP. To 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17
 There are two roughly equally sized groups of temporary workers in our sample: those with remaining contract 
duration up to 3 months and those with remaining duration from 3 months to 5 years. 
18
 The latter result is derived by integrating (7) over the interval [6; 120]. 
19
 Note further that the estimate for the temporary job dummy implies that the willingness to pay for a temporary job 
is equal to 303 (s.e. 42), which exceeds the derived willingness to pay based on the coefficient of the remaining 
duration. This makes sense, because the latter estimate measures only the risk of becoming unemployed, whereas the 
former includes the value of having a permanent contract that may offer also other fringe benefits (e.g. pensions) but 
also more training (see Booth et al., 2002). 
 
20
 The model includes both dummies for workers with verbal contracts and contracts of agreement . 
21
 Employing a Hausman t-test, the restriction was not rejected at the 10% level. Moreover, the results are hardly 
sensitive with respect to the choice of 120 months. 
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address this issue, we have instrumented the wage using several instruments.22 The instruments 
used are (i) job location (16 regional dummies), (ii) whether Estonian is the worker's mother 
language, (iii) working in unionised firm, (iv) whether the worker was unemployed in the 
previous year, (v) whether the worker was not in the labour force in the previous year, and      
(vi) more detailed controls for occupation.23   
We have experimented with a combination of several instrumental variables, but the 
results are similar. In line with the measurement error argument, the estimate for the wage is 
somewhat larger (in absolute value), but the estimates of the other explanatory variables, 
including the remaining contract duration, are essentially the same. The lowest MWP for an extra 
month among a range of specifications is equal to 6.3 (s.e. 3.5). Application of a Hausman-test 
does not reject the standard probit estimate at the 10% level for any of the estimates. The overall 
conclusion is therefore that measurement error of the wage may have a minor downward 
influence on the reported results in Table 4, but the downward bias is too small to detect with the 
given data. 
The remaining contract duration may be endogenous if the total contract duration is 
endogenous. It may be argued that the total contract duration, the sum of the elapsed and 
remaining contract duration, is endogenous with respect to the job search choice. For example, 
                                                          
22
 In this way, we also address the issue that the wage is endogenously determined, although in search models this is 
usually not considered an issue of large concern. 
23
 We emphasize here that in the job search model, residence location is included as control variables. The main 
assumption is that the workplace location affects the wage, in line with a large empirical literature, whereas the job 
search activity takes place from the residence location. It is clear that Estonian language skills are related to 
productivity and therefore affect the wage. There is no good reason why Estonian language skills directly affect 
search activity (we control for ethnicity). There is a large literature which shows that wages are higher in unionized 
firms. Conditional on the type of employment contract, it is less plausible that workers’ search activity depends on 
the unionization of the firm. Further, it is well known that previous employment situation has a strong effect on the 
wage, because it affects the bargaining position of the worker, but there is less reason to suspect that the previous 
employment status has a direct effect on the search position now (conditional on the type of contract). Finally, 
although it is standard that the wage depends on the type of occupation, there is less reason to believe that job search 
activity depends on a more detailed classification of occupational structure (conditional on contract type), so wage is 
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one may imagine that individuals with low search costs (e.g. because of a well-developed 
personal network) are more likely to accept shorter employment contracts.24 As a consequence, 
the remaining employment duration is also endogenous. Note however that the observed 
remaining duration is predominantly a random draw from a duration distribution determined by 
the total employment duration and the probability that the employee leaves the job before the 
contract expires, so some of the variation in the remaining duration is purely exogenous. One of 
the consequences is that the potential bias of the remaining duration variable is substantially less 
than the potential bias of the total duration variables. This may imply that presuming exogeneity 
of the remaining duration is a reasonable assumption. Nevertheless, to deal with the potential 
bias we have investigated the endogeneity problem. 
Taking into account the endogeneity of the contract duration is not standard, because the 
contract duration is related to the endogenously chosen type of contract. A permanent contract 
may be interpreted as a contract with a long remaining duration, of which the exact length is 
unknown. Therefore, we do not control for type of contract, but we instrument the observed 
contract duration of temporary workers and use the predicted contract duration of permanent 
workers using the same instruments. For workers with a permanent contract, we presume that the 
remaining contract duration is at least 5 years (and maximally 30 years), for the ‘verbal 
contracts’ and ‘contracts of agreement’, we presume that the contract duration is less than 5 years 
(and minimally one month). Hence, by means of interval regression we estimate the first stage of 
the instrumental approach, where DUR is measured in months: 
log (DUR*) = γ'X1 + v1,  DUR* = DUR  if TEMP=1,    (8a) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
instrumented with nine categories of occupation, whereas in the search model only manual and non-manual workers 
are distinguished. 
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1≤ DUR* ≤ 60 if TEMP=0 for ‘agreements’ and verbal contracts,   (8b) 
60 ≤ DUR* ≤ 360 for permanent employment contacts;  (8c) 
 
As instrument for the remaining duration we use whether the worker’s firm is unionised, 
Estonian language skills and the two employment status indicators in the previous years.25 The 
results are reported in Table 5, specification [1]. We find now that the estimate of the coefficient 
of the (logarithm of the) remaining contract duration is substantially higher (in absolute value) 
and the MWP for the remaining contract duration is about twice as high.  Note however that this 
estimate is not directly comparable to the MWP for the contract duration as reported in Table 4, 
because the latter estimate is conditional on the type of contract. Plausibly, as argued above, 
workers derive also utility from the type of contract (independent of the length of the contract). 
For example, workers with permanent contract are more likely to receive on-the-job training 
(Booth et al., 2002). Hence, the results reported in Table 5, specification [1] are consistent with 
those of Table 4, in the sense that they exceed those of Table 4. We have also estimated the 
model instrumenting both the wage and the remaining contract duration using the same 
instruments as discussed above. Again the outcomes are rather insensitive to the choice of the 
instruments. It appears now that the MWP for an additional month is 7.4 (s.e. 3.5)  ,so close to 
the standard probit estimate.  
We have estimated the same models for males and females separately. A consistent 
finding for all the model specifications is that the estimate of the wage coefficient does not 
depend on gender, but the estimate for the coefficient of remaining duration is about 30 to 40 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24
 Endogeneity does not occur when employers offer only one type of employment duration (e.g. one year). Because 
many employers tend to standardize the employment duration to fixed periods, the bias of the endogeneity maybe 
quite limited. 
25
 As one may expect being unemployed or out of the labour force in previous year, have a strong negative effect on 
the (logarithm of the) contract duration, whereas workers in unionised firms have longer expected duration. 
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percent lower for females.26 Hence, the estimates suggest that the MWP for the contract duration 
is (somewhat) higher for males than for females. This finding is in line with Booth et al. (2002), 
who report that males are more likely than females to experience a reduction in their future 
wages as a consequence of holding a temporary job. 
Hence, our main conclusion is that workers attach substantial value to the remaining 
duration of their employment contract. Given the increased risk of becoming unemployed for 
workers with a temporary contract combined with the observations that only minority of 
unemployed in Estonia receive earnings-related unemployment benefits and that the 
unemployment rate was substantial (between 10 and 14 percent) at the period of observation, the 
above estimates seems intuitively reasonable. Different specifications imply about the same size 
for the value of a permanent job, whereas it is important to distinguish between estimates that are 
based on temporary workers and thus refer only to the absence of unemployment risk and 
estimates that are based on all workers and include other job attributes related to permanent 
contracts (e.g. more job training) as well. Note that we find that a worker is at least willing to 
pay once a monthly wage to swap a temporary contract into a permanent one. A formal stylised 
search model which leads to an estimate of similar order of magnitude is presented in section 
5.3.27 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Furthermore, all other coefficients of the explanatory variables except one (being divorced) have about the same 
value suggesting that for the Estonian labour market presuming that the coefficients are not gender specific is a 
reasonable assumption.  
27
 Results reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that, other things equal, search effort declines with job tenure and 
increases with education.. Women are significantly less likely to search than men, other things equal. Night work is 
generally thought of as attribute that reduce utility. Our results however, do not suggest that night work has 
significant impact on search behaviour. Estimates by gender (not reported here) suggest that single men are less 
likely to search, while divorced women are more likely to search than those living with a partner. Males working 
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5.2.2 Lithuania 
The Lithuanian year 2000 data provide the total duration of employment contract and elapsed 
job tenure. Under the assumption that temporary contracts are not renewed, the remaining 
duration can be calculated as the total duration minus the job tenure. We include the logarithm of 
the total contract duration controlling for job tenure. The above assumption is probably valid for 
the majority of temporary workers as the contract duration is less than job tenure (76% of the 
temporary workers have a job tenure less than the contract duration). For the 24% of temporary 
workers who have a job tenure which exceeds the contract duration, it may still be the case that 
the total duration measure is a reasonable approximation of the remaining duration (controlling 
for tenure).28 This implies that our estimates of the MWP for remaining duration of the contract 
are somewhat downward biased for Lithuania, but because this bias only applies to the minority 
of workers it is likely very modest. Note that for Lithuania, the data do not distinguish between 
different types of permanent contracts. Table 6 (specifications [1] and [2]) provide estimates of a 
standard Probit model and a model with imputed contract duration of 10 years for permanent 
contracts.29 According to the latter, an average temporary worker (contract duration 6 months) is 
willing to pay 8 to 9 percent of monthly wage for a one month extension, or, equivalently, pay 
once about 150 (s.e. 36) percent of monthly wage to get a 10 year contract. These results (close 
to Estonian ones) hardly change when imputed duration for permanent contract is 5 rather than 
10 years.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
less than 55 hours a week and for females working less than 52 hours search activity decreases with working hours; 
above these limits search effort increases with hours. 
28
 Given at random selection of working individuals, the expected remaining contract duration is exactly half the 
total contract duration for temporary workers (because the temporary contract duration is finite). So, the logarithm 
of the remaining duration is equal to the logarithm of the total duration plus random noise (under the assumption of 
random quitting behaviour).  
29
  We have repeated the estimates based on data for the period 2002-2003. Unfortunately, for this period, contract 
duration data were incorrectly reported and cannot be used in the current paper. However, for the model with 
temporary job dummy estimated coefficients were almost identical to the results for the year 2000 (the main 
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As a sensivity analysis, we have re-estimated the model for Lithuania with the remaining 
contract duration calculated as the contract duration minus job tenure. For the minority of 
observations where the contract duration exceeds job tenure, we have calculated the remaining 
contract duration as half the total contract duration. It appears that the results are (almost) 
identical. 
In one other specification (Table 6, specification [3]), we do not control for sector and 
region, but we control for the local unemployment rate (county and gender-specific) and the 
gender-specific annual percentage change in employment in the (two-digit) industry of 
respondent’s main job; the latter is also interacted with the contract duration. It turns out that 
workers employed in a declining industry attach considerably higher values to occupying a 
permanent position: the willingness to pay for swapping a 6 months contract into a 10 years one 
goes up by 4.6 (s.e. 3.0) percent of monthly wage per each percentage point decline in industry 
employment. Presumably, in a declining industry the chances that a temporary job contract will 
be renewed or will be changed into a permanent position (within the same firm) are lower than in 
other industries.30 So, temporary workers are more concerned about an employment cut in the 
sector they work in.31 Further, the estimates by gender (not reported) indicate that the MWP to 
avoid temporary contracts is somewhat higher for men (178 percent of monthly wage, s.e. 54) 
than for women (118 percent of monthly wage, s.e. 43).  
About half of all workers work either at nights or on weekends (or both), and these job 
attributes prove to have an impact on search activities in Lithuania. Workers on average are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
difference is that the statistical significance of most estimates is higher, due to a larger number of observations).  
This provides further support for our main result. 
30
 See Booth et al. (2002) for evidence in Britain on the chances that a temporary job is changed into a permanent 
one within the same firm. 
31
 To the extent that a decline in industry employment can be interpreted as a job attribute, the estimates (Table 6, 
specification [3] suggest that a worker with a 6 month contract values each percentage point of (gender-and-
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willing to pay 4.5 percent (s.e. 1.7) of their monthly wage to avoid working an extra night and 
about 9.8 percent (s.e. 4.7) to avoid working an extra Saturday or Sunday (not at night). Reported 
estimates are based on proxies for proportion of nights and weekend days worked. These 
estimates suggest that the discomfort of working at night or in the weekends is substantial. 
Further, it indicates that the disutility of working during the weekend days is higher than during 
the night. This makes sense, as Lithuania is a (mostly) Catholic country, so working on 
weekends has the disadvantage of missing the Sunday service. 
 The effect of the local unemployment rate on the probability of being observed searching 
is theoretically ambiguous a priori: If the probability of finding a job is low, workers are 
expected to search less, however the period of search is increased as the probability of being 
accepted is small. Positive relationship between local unemployment and on-the-job search was 
recently documented for the UK by Fuentes (2002), but see Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) 
and Mekkelholt (1993) for the Netherlands. We find that the local unemployment rate has a 
positive impact on workers' search effort. 32 
 
5.3 A stylised search model 
We have seen above that the willingness to pay to avoid a temporary job exceeds the monthly 
wage. Hence, temporary workers are willing to pay once more than their monthly wage to obtain 
a permanent job. Does this make sense? We will use a stylised search model to show that 
estimates that imply that the willingness to pay to avoid temporary contracts exceeds the wage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
industry-specific) fall in annual average employment at –6.3 (s.e. 3.2) percent of the monthly pay, while for a 
worker with a 5 years contract this MWP falls to –2 percent  and becomes statistically insignificant.  
32
 Finally, we will discuss the other determinants of the search decision. Results reported in Table 6 show that 
likelihood of search decreases with age and tenure (for tenures up to 21 years). Females and ethnic minorities are 
less likely to search, although both effects are not statistically significant. Like it was found for the UK by Pissarides 
and Wadsworth, 1994, tertiary education promotes on-the-job search. Divorced persons (like in Estonia) are more 
inclined to search. . 
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rate are plausible. Suppose an individual has a temporary employment contract, earns wage w 
and anticipates becoming unemployed at rate δ and finding a permanent job at rate q. The 
individual discounts the future at rate ρ. So, lifetime utility V can be written as follows: ρV = w 
+ δ(U-V)+qVp, where Vp denotes the lifetime utility of a permanent contract. When unemployed, 
this individual will receive a benefit B (B < w) with probability pi < 1 and will find again a 
temporary job at rate λ. In the permanent job, the individual will earn wage wp forever, so ρVp = 
w
p
. So, the unemployed lifetime utility U can be written as: ρU = b+λ(V-U), where b = piB. 
Lifetime utility V can then be written as: 
                                  
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The willingness to pay (WP) for δ is defined as [V(δ)-V(0)]/∂V/∂w, so: 
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Now suppose that unemployment benefits levels are low, so b = 0 (which will be a 
reasonable assumption for Lithuania and Estonia). It follows that:  
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For reasonably chosen values of the parameters, it appears that WP/w < -1. For example, 
data for Lithuania (OECD, 2003) indicate that λ, the annual rate of becoming re-employed, is 
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0.35 and δ, the annual rate of becoming unemployed for temporary workers, is at least 0.22. 
Further, q must be larger than ρ and wp must exceed w. Presuming that the discount rate is 0.10 
shows now that WP/w is larger than one in absolute value, so the willingness to pay to escape a 
temporary job exceeds the current wage rate.33  
 
5.4 Hedonic wage estimates 
To compare the above estimates with an approach based on static compensating wage 
differentials, we have also estimated several hedonic wage models. These models include the 
same control variables as the search models plus the instruments discussed above. In line with 
other empirical studies, it appears that a hedonic wage model based on cross-section data gives a 
negative compensation estimate for a temporary job34 (see Moretti, 2000). Our estimates suggest 
that in Estonia workers with temporary contracts earn 14 percent less, other things equal; for men 
the differential is 16 percent, while for women just 9 percent Hedonic wage estimates for 
Lithuania are similar to Estonian: e.g. in 2000, temporary workers earned 8 percent less than then 
otherwise similar workers with permanent contracts. Hence, the conclusion, consistent with other 
hedonic wage studies, is that temporary workers are not compensated by higher wages which is 
generally perceived as a puzzle by most economists, but which may have an economic rationale. 
For example, Relitzer and Taylor (1991) use an efficiency wage model, assuming that 
monitoring of workers is costly and that product demand is uncertain, and show that wages paid 
to permanent workers exceed those paid to temporary workers. Note that because we do not have 
                                                          
33
 Likely, this simple model underestimates the true MWP, because we presume that workers are risk neutral, we 
ignore that temporary workers are more likely to leave the labor force and receive less on-the-job training.  
34
 We find that there is a positive compensation differential for night work in Lithuania (this is in line with the 
literature, see Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002), and consistent with the fact that the search method gives 
significant MWP to avoid night work in this country). 
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a panel data set and unobserved heterogeneity related to productivity may bias these estimates, 
these hedonic wage results should be interpreted with caution.35 
While we do not know whether a hedonic approach generates estimates that are in 
general better or worse than those based on job search activity/job mobility, as also argued by 
Gronberg and Reed (1994), we emphasise that the hedonic wage method presumes that workers 
are fully compensated and are perfectly mobile.  It does not allow for the possibility that workers 
search for other jobs and that changes in jobs are not immediate (for example due to lack of 
information about other job alternatives). The absence of on-the-job search does not hold in our 
sample of temporary workers: 46% of workers with temporary contracts in our sample search for 
other jobs. So, the hedonic wage method presumes that workers are in jobs that maximise their 
utility, but in our sample, about half of the population of workers with temporary contracts are 
involved in on-the-job search and are therefore not in jobs that maximise utility. This indicates 
that the assumption of perfect mobility is not innocuous for research on the duration of the 
temporary employment contract.36 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes can be 
derived from data on on-the-job search activity. The main advantage of this estimation method, 
compared to estimation methods based on job moves, is that one needs less restrictive 
                                                          
35
 The inability to control for individual characteristics associated with higher probability of unemployment in a 
cross section may lead to a downward bias in the estimate of compensating differentials. In a cross section, workers 
of higher unmeasured ability may earn higher wages and suffer less unemployment, so that the observed 
differentials may be wrong-signed (Moretti, 2000). 
36
 This raises the question whether our theoretical job search model is consistent with the observation that 
individuals accept temporary contracts when they know beforehand that they are not compensated? One answer 
consistent with search theory is that temporary contracts are mainly accepted by unemployed searchers (and job 
searchers with temporary contracts of shorter duration). By accepting a temporary job, unemployed searchers do not 
forego the opportunity to search for a permanent job. In equilibrium, these temporary jobs are more likely offered by 
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assumptions on the search environment. In particular, one may assume that the workers' 
separation risk depends on nonwage job attributes such, as for example, the employment 
contract. The search approach to estimate the workers' marginal willingness to pay is applied to 
observations from Estonia and Lithuania. We have provided evidence that workers attach 
substantial value to the remaining duration of their employment contract and that the value of a 
permanent contract is higher in industries where employment falls. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
less profitable firms, which have lower opportunity costs in having vacancies go unfilled, and which offer temporary 
jobs and lower wages (Hwang et al., 1992). 
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Table 1.  Flows out of employment into unemployment and inelasticity by type of employment contract 
in Lithuania, 2000 and Estonia, 1998-1999 (percent) 
. 
 Estonia Lithuania 
 
1997-1998 1999-2000 1999-2000 2002-2003 
 
Perm. Temp. Perm. Temp. Perm. Temp. Perm. Temp. 
Into Unemployment 4.0 10.3 6.1 15.8 6.0 22.1 1.9 12.7 
Into Inactivity 5.3 9.4 4.8 13.1 
  
2.4 8.6 
Notes: a Source: LFS data and own calculation 
 
Table 2. Incidence of on-the-job search in Lithuania, 2000 and Estonia, 1998-2001 
Percent 
 Lithuania Estonia 
Employees All Men Women All Men Women 
All  8.8 9.6   8.1 4.2 4.8 3.7 
Full-time   7.2 8.3    5.9 
 
3.9 4.4 3.3 
of which:    Tenure ≤ 6 months 13.9 
 
14.4 
 
13.1 6.5 7.5 5.4 
                   Tenure 2 – 5 years  7.3    8.5 
 
  5.9 
 
4.0 4.2 3.9 
                   Tenure ≥ 15 years   2.9 
 
  2.8 3.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Part-time (less than 32 hours a week) 23.6 34.7 19.0 8.5 13.9 6.5 
Working more than 48 hours a week    5.4 5.8 4.5 
Temporary contracts 45.5 53.1 32.6 26.8 30.3 21.3 
Of which:                 ≤ 6 months a 47.9 55.0 35.9 31.3 33.5 28.1 
                                 > 6 months b 39.2 48.1 23.6 23.4 29.1 13.8 
Notes: a For Estonia – contracts with remaining duration ≤ 3 months. b For Estonia – contracts with remaining 
duration > 3 months.  Source: LFS data and own calculation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. On-the-job search by reason in Lithuania, 2000 and Estonia, 2001                              
                                                     Percent 
 Lithuanian employees 
Reasons All Men Women Part-time Temporary 
1 Risk or certainty of loss of 
present job / transitional job 
    19.3     21.5     17.0 17.0        64.7 
2 Seeking more hours a     20.3     20.0     20.6 39.3          7.2 
3 Wish to have better working 
conditions, pay etc. 
    52.7    51.8    53.6 42.1       25.2 
4 Other     7.8      6.8     8.8 1.6         2.9 
 
 
Estonian employees 
1 Risk or certainty of loss of 
present job / transitional job 
17.8 17.6 18.0 19.9         70.1 
2 Seeking more hours 21.5 20.5 22.8 31.6           8.9 
3 Wish to have better working 
conditions, pay etc. 
57.9 58.2 57.5 46.2          21.0 
4 Other   2.8   3.6   1.9  2.3            - 
Notes:  a Including search for a second job. Source: LFS data and own calculation. 
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Table 4. Determinants of on-the-job search and MWP 
estimates for remaining temporary contract duration in Estonia (1998-2001) 
 [1] [2] 
Method Probit Two stage Probit a 
Variables Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
 
    
Log wage -0.406*** 0.047 -0.637*** 0.162 
Log remaining contract durationb -0.236** 0.120 -0.241** 0.117 
Public service act  0.314 0.226 0.317 0.224 
Contract of agreement 0.170 0.195 0.188 0.191 
Verbal contract 0.369*** 0.124 0.331*** 0.127 
Temporary job 1.231*** 0.173 1.166*** 0.171 
Nights worked 0.135 0.111 0.101 0.112 
Weekly working hours  -0.018*** 0.007 -0.010 0.010 
Weekly working hours sq./100  0.019** 0.008 0.016** 0.009 
Tenure  -0.014*** 0.005 -0.013*** 0.005 
Age 0.064*** 0.015 0.068*** 0.015 
Age squared/100 -0.098*** 0.018 -0.105*** 0.019 
Rural resident -0.062 0.061 -0.047 0.061 
Female -0.274*** 0.056 -0.34*** 0.065 
Ethnic minority -0.030 0.061 -0.049 0.069 
Single -0.018 0.066 -0.029 0.067 
Divorced 0.199*** 0.073 0.198*** 0.072 
Higher education 0.394*** 0.108 0.485*** 0.124 
Postsecondary prof. education  0.194* 0.109 0.232* 0.110 
Secondary general education 0.104 0.086 0.124 0.085 
Secondary vocational education 0.190** 0.089 0.214** 0.089 
Vocational education 0.112 0.097 0.116 0.095 
Non-manual occupation -0.103 0.065 - 0.021 0.077 
Plant size controls (5) yes yes 
Regional controls (16) yes yes 
Industry controls (15) yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1376 0.1216 
Log L -3179.9 -3238.9 
Number of observations 21044 21044 
  
 Derived MWP estimates (%  wage) 
 [1]  [2]            
Job attributes MWP  s.e. MWP s.e. 
Remaining contract duration, 
monthsc 9.7 5.1 6.3 3.5 
Permanentd vs. 6 months contract 170.9 89.3 130.1 72.2 
Notes: a In specification [2], the wage is instrumented. b Interacted with temporary job dummy. c For a worker with a 
new 6 months contract. d Assuming remaining duration 10 years.  
*, **, *** - indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively, based on 
robust standard errors. 
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Table 5. Determinants of on-the-job search and MWP estimates 
for remaining contract duration in Estonia (1998-2001) 
 [1] [2] 
 Two-stage probit a Two-stage probit b 
Variables Coeff. s. e . Coeff. s. e. 
 
    
Log wage -0416*** 0.047 -0.838*** 0.168 
Log remaining contract duration -0.517*** 0.115 -0.372*** 0.129 
Nights worked 0.101  0.112 0.065 0.113 
Weekly working hours  -0.025***  0.007 -0.008 0.010 
Weekly working hours sq./100  0.026*** 0.008 0.017* 0.009 
Tenure  -0.013*** 0.005 -0.010** 0.005 
Age 0.066*** 0.015 0.073*** 0.015 
Age squared/100 -0.101*** 0.018 -0.111*** 0.019 
Rural resident -0.084** 0.060 -0.066 0.060 
Female -0.274*** 0.054 -0.403*** 0.065 
Ethnic minority -0.040 0.061 -0.084 0.069 
Single -0.046  0.067 -0.057 0.067 
Divorced 0.177**  0.072 0.184*** 0.071 
Higher education 0.411*** 0.110 0.553*** 0.118 
Postsecondary prof. education  0.219** 0.109 0.272** 0.108 
Secondary general education 0.114  0.087 0.139* 0.084 
Secondary vocational education 0.200** 0.090 0.229*** 0.088 
Vocational education 0112  0.089 0.111 0.095 
Non-manual occupation -0.098  0.064 0.041 0.078 
Plant size controls (5) yes yes 
Regional controls (16) yes yes 
Industry controls (15) yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1227 0.1086 
Log L -3245.7 -3298.1 
Number of observations 21075 21075 
 
 
 Derived MWP estimates (% wage) 
 [1] [2] 
Job attributes MWP  s.e. MWP s.e. 
Remaining contract duration, 
monthsc 20.7 5.3 7.4 3.5 
Permanent vs. 6 months contract 427.7 109.3 152.6 72.1 
Notes: a  The remaining contract duration is instrumented for all workers (temporary and permanent workers), see 
(8a)-(8c), while the wage is not instrumented  
b
. The wage is instrumented. The remaining contract duration is instrumented for all workers (temporary and 
permanent workers). 
c For a worker with a new 6 months contract.   
*, **, *** - indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively, based on 
robust standard errors. 
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Table 6. Determinants of on-the-job search and MWP 
estimates for contract duration in Lithuania, 2000. 
Variables      [1]       [2]    [3] 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
 
      
Log wage -0.639*** 0.111 -0.635*** 0.111 -0.570*** 0.105 
Temporary joba  1.421*** 0.309   
  
Log contract durationa -0.236  0.165 -0.316*** 0.049 -0.286*** 0.049 
Night work   0.564*** 0.189  0.568*** 0.188  0.453** 0.185 
Weekends   0.491** 0.224  0.497** 0.223  0.518** 0.225 
Weekly working hours   -0.050*** 0.017 -0.050*** 0.017 -0.057*** 0.016 
Weekly working hours sq. /100   0.048** 0.020  0.048** 0.020  0.055*** 0.019 
Tenure  -0.026* 0.015 -0.026* 0.015 -0.031** 0.015 
Tenure sq. /100  0.065  0.042  0.066  0.042  0.077* 0.042 
Age -0.018*** 0.005 -0.018*** 0.005 -0.016*** 0.004 
Rural resident -0.257* 0.134 -0.253* 0.134 -0.397*** 0.126 
Female -0.165  0.109 -0.166  0.109 -0.030  0.114 
Ethnic minority -0.162  0.134 -0.162  0.134 -0.037  0.124 
Single -0.224* 0.117 -0.221* 0.117 -0.163  0.116 
Divorced  0.278* 0.150  0.279* 0.150  0.285* 0.146 
Higher education  0.605*** 0.208  0.607*** 0.209  0.521** 0.204 
Secondary education  0.311  0.201  0.315  0.202  0.232  0.196 
Vocational education  0.426* 0.251  0.437* 0.252  0.326  0.251 
Non-manual occupation -0.049  0.129 -0.049  0.129 -0.017  0.128 
Empl. growth sectorb, %  
  
  -0.041*  0.025 
(Empl. growth sector × Log dur.)/10 
  
 
 0.088  0.055 
Local unemployment ratec, %  
  
 
 0.039*** 0.013 
Plant size controls (4) yes yes yes 
Regional controls (12) yes yes no 
Industry controls (24) yes yes no 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2159 0.2157 0.1978 
Log L -581.6 -581.7 -595.0 
     
 
 
Derived MWP estimates (% wage) 
Job attributes [1]  [2]  [3]  
 MWP  s.e. MWP s.e. MWP  s.e. 
Contract duration, monthsd 6.3   4.6 8.4 2.0 9.1 2.3 
Permanent vs. 6 months contract 131 98 149 36 160 40 
Notes: Probit estimates with robust standard errors, 2641 observations. a Duration of permanent 
contract is assumed to be 10 years in specifications [2] and [3]. b Gender-specific percentage of 
employment growth by 15 major NACE sectors. c Gender-specific unemployment rate (percent) 
according to November 1999 LFS  in the county where respondent’s main job is located. d For a 
worker with a 6 months contract. 
*, **, *** - indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively, 
based on robust standard errors. 
 
